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CALIFORNIA BANK & TRUST V. LAWLOR: A
MORE CERTAIN FUTURE FOR
CALIFORNIA’S SHAM GUARANTEE DEFENSE
Brett D. Young∗
I. INTRODUCTION
During the Great Depression, California enacted a series of
statutes, known as the antideficiency statutes, designed to protect
borrowers from aggressive bank actions in collecting debts.1
California Code of Civil Procedure sections 580b through 580d are
part of this statutory scheme and prevent deficiency judgments
against borrowers when certain conditions are met.2 A potential
“sham” guarantee arises when the primary obligor on the loan is also
the guarantor.3 This sometimes occurs when the primary obligor and
the guarantor in the transaction are the same entity. When the
guarantee is later determined to be a sham, usually after a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale, the lender is prevented from seeking a deficiency
judgment against both the guarantor and the obligor because they are
the same party, and thus, both are protected by section 580d.4 By

∗ J.D. Loyola Law School, May 2015; B.A. History and Psychology, University of
California, Santa Barbara, June 2012. I would like to thank Professor Dan Schechter for his
unwavering guidance, support, and passion for teaching. This Comment would not be possible
without the hard work and dedication of the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review, and I owe them many thanks. Finally, I would be remiss not to thank my grandmother,
who believed in me and instilled in me an insatiable thirst for learning.
1. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Barton, 789 F. Supp. 1043, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
(citation omitted).
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 580b,580d (West 2012), amended by 2014 Cal. Legis. Serv.
Ch. 71 (West) (S.B. 1304); id. § 580c. 1 MILLER & STARR CAL. REAL EST. DIGEST Deeds of
Trust § 45 (3d ed. 2014). “If the security is insufficient, the creditor’s right to a judgment against
the debtor for the deficiency may be limited or barred by Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580a, 580b, 580d,
or 726.” Id.
3. Id. “The sham guaranty defense arises from the concept that that a borrower cannot also
be the guarantor of its own debt.” Eric J. Rans & David J. Williams, A Lender’s Guide for
Avoiding Sham Guaranty Claims—The Devil Is in the Details, 128 BANKING L.J. 483, 485
(2011).
4. River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 801 (Ct. App. 1995).
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successfully asserting this sham guarantee defense, guarantors are
able to avoid personal liability despite the promises in the guarantee.
California courts and the state legislature have treated this
defense inconsistently. The combined failure of the state legislature
and courts to articulate a clear-cut rule has created chaos in the
application of the sham guarantee defense. In the recent California
case of California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor,5 the California appellate
court’s analysis of the sham guarantee defense moved California
toward a more definitive approach to determine when a guarantee is
a sham.6 The court limited the defense’s use to situations where a
true sham was present, and eliminated the possibility a business
owner could escape liability for a self-created sham.
This Comment addresses the problematic use of the sham
guarantee defense by guarantors and argues that courts should follow
the recent Lawlor decision. Part II details the court’s decision in
Lawlor. Part III explains the inconsistent application of the sham
guarantee defense through an assessment of three important
California cases. Part IV assesses the importance of the Lawlor
court’s limitation of the application of the sham guarantee defense to
true sham situations. Furthermore, this part argues that the Lawlor
decision will help future lenders avoid lending to potential sham
guarantors. Finally, Part V concludes that the court’s ruling, while
unfavorable toward guarantors, creates necessary precedent for
lenders.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In December 2004, Alliance loaned approximately $2 million to
Cartwright Properties, LLC (“Cartwright”), a limited liability
company formed by Jerry Smith, Smith’s wife, and David Lawlor
(collectively, “Defendants”).7 Alliance subsequently made a second

5. 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38 (Ct. App. 2013), as modified (Dec. 20, 2013).
6. See generally id. at 48. The court stated that to determine the existence of a sham
guaranty, the court must look to the “parties’ agreement to determine whether the guaranties
constitute an attempt to circumvent the antideficiency law and recover deficiency judgments
when those judgments otherwise would be prohibited.” Id. (citations omitted). “This requires [the
court] to examine whether the legal relationship between the guarantor and the purported primary
obligor truly separated the guarantor from the principal underlying obligation, and whether the
lender required or structured the transaction in a manner designed to cast a primary obligor in the
appearance of a guarantor.” Id.
7. Id. at 40.
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loan to Cartwright in October 2006.8 In exchange, Cartwright signed
promissory notes and gave Alliance trust deeds in Cartwright’s office
building as security for the loan.9 Additionally, Alliance required
Defendants to execute commercial guarantees for the loans.10
Defendants were involved in other transactions with Bank.
Smith and Lawlor also owned Covenant Management (“Covenant”),
which was the general partner of two business entities collectively
labeled by the court as Heritage Orcas.11 Heritage Orcas obtained a
loan from Alliance for approximately $10.5 million in June 2008 in
exchange for a promissory note and deeds of trust in two properties
owned by Heritage Orcas.12 Smith, Lawlor, Covenant, and another
company owned by Smith and Lawlor executed a continuing
guaranty on the loans.13
California Bank & Trust (the “Bank”) came into possession of
the notes and deeds of trust in 2009.14 After Heritage Orcas and
Cartwright defaulted on the loans, the Bank elected to foreclose on
the properties and enforce the commercial guarantees signed by
Defendants.15 The Bank purchased both properties at nonjudicial
foreclosure sales for partial-credit bids.16 The outstanding balance on
the loans totaled approximately $15 million.17
The Bank subsequently filed motions for summary judgment on
its breach of guaranty claims in order to obtain deficiency judgments
against Defendants in their roles as guarantors.18 In order to avoid
liability, Defendants argued that the guarantee was a sham because
they were actually the primary obligors on the loans and not true
guarantors.19 The trial court refused to allow Defendants to use the
sham defense because they had not raised it affirmatively in their
answer.20

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Defendants appealed the trial court’s action, and once again
sought protection under California’s antideficiency statutes as sham
guarantors.21 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision to
grant the summary judgment.22 However, the appellate court also
stated that there was no evidence the guarantees were actually a
sham.23 The court found that there was sufficient legal separation
between Defendants’ business entities and the Defendants as
individuals so as to not qualify the guarantees as shams.24
III. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: COMPARING CALIFORNIA COURTS’
TREATMENT OF SHAM GUARANTEES
Sham guarantee defense cases have troubled California courts
for decades. A brief analysis of three relevant cases will highlight the
courts’ inconsistencies when faced with sham guarantees. Torrey
Pines Bank v. Hoffman25 sets the legal standard courts have struggled
to apply when facing a possible sham guarantee while River Bank
America v. Diller26 and Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner27 provide
conflicting precedent for California courts to comply with.
A. Torrey Pines Bank v. Hoffman
Torrey Pines Bank presents a perfect case study of how courts
have traditionally applied the sham guarantee defense. Jerome and
Naomi Joy Hoffman (the “Hoffmans”) purchased a parcel of
property and received construction financing from Torrey Pines
Bank to build a ninety-two-unit apartment complex.28 The borrower
on the note was a revocable family trust in which the Hoffmans were
the trustees and beneficiaries.29 The bank required the Hoffmans to
personally guarantee the loan.30 The trust eventually defaulted on the
loan, and the bank nonjudicially foreclosed on the property.31 The
bank sought a deficiency judgment against the Hoffmans as the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
282 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991).
River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1995).
Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1964).
Torrey Pines, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 356–57.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id.
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guarantors on the note.32 The trial court found for the Hoffmans on
the theory that their guarantee was a sham, and the bank appealed.33
The appellate court began its discussion by defining a guarantor
as one who “promises to answer for the debt.”34 The court stated that
a sham guarantee was designed to subvert California’s antideficiency
laws by structuring the deal in a way that made the primary obligor
liable for deficiency judgments.35 The court held that there was not
sufficient legal separation between the trust, as the primary obligor,
and the Hoffmans, as guarantors, because the paperwork and
financial information presented to the bank on behalf of the trust as
the borrower and the Hoffmans as guarantors was “substantially the
same.”36 On these facts the court found that the guarantor and obligor
were similar, if not identical, creating a sham guarantee.37
B. Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner
In Valinda, a court of appeal muddied the water surrounding
California’s sham guarantee defense. The defendants in Valinda
purchased land from Valinda Builders, Inc. (“Valinda”) as
individuals.38 The defendants later formed a corporation and, without
the lenders consent, took title to the land in the name of the
corporation.39 The corporation, not the individual defendants, issued
the promissory note and deed of trust securing the property.40 The
defendants as individuals then personally guaranteed the loan.41
The appellate court held that the guarantee was a sham because
the corporation was merely an instrument of the defendants.42 The
court concluded that the defendants as individuals were always liable
on the loan, regardless of whether the corporation was the primary
obligor and a separate legal entity.43 Consequently, the court held
there was not sufficient legal separation between the borrower and
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 358.
See id.
Id. at 360.
See id. at 361.
See id.
See id.
Valinda Builders, Inc. v. Bissner, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735, 735–36 (Ct. App. 1964).
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 737.
Id.
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the guarantor to constitute a legitimate guarantee.44 The court stated,
perhaps in dicta, that “one who contracts to buy land does not alter
his identity and relation as purchaser by a purported guaranty of
performance of his own obligation to pay the purchase price.”45
Therefore, the guarantee was a sham and the defendants had no
personal obligation on the loan.46 This is a clear departure from how
courts had traditionally viewed the sham guarantee defense.
C. River Bank America v. Diller
In River Bank, the appellate court took a position that was more
favorable toward lenders.47 Sanford Diller and his wife were the sole
trustees of the DNS trust, which owned all of the stock in
Prometheus Development (“Prometheus”).48 Prometheus, with Diller
as the principal officer, obtained construction loans for an apartment
complex with River Bank America (“River Bank”).49 River Bank, as
a condition of the loan, required Diller to use another limited
partnership under his control to act as the borrower, and Diller to act
as the guarantor on the loan.50
After the primary obligor defaulted on the loan, River Bank
nonjudicially foreclosed on the property.51 A deficiency of $12.9
million was left after the property was sold, and River Bank
commenced an action against Diller as the guarantor for a deficiency
judgment.52 The trial court granted Diller’s motion for summary
judgment, denying the enforcement of the guarantee.53
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, the appellate court found
that the loan’s financial structure created triable issues of fact
concerning whether the sham guarantee defense applied.54 One can
infer from the court’s holding that if the lender structured the deal to
circumvent the antideficiency statutes, the guarantee would have

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id.
Id. at 738.
See id.
See River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 (Ct. App. 1995).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 802.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 803.
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been deemed a sham and River Bank would not have recovered a
deficiency judgment against Diller.55
IV. ANALYSIS
The use, and sometimes abuse, of the sham defense is enshrined
in California law. However, it is imperative that the courts properly
apply the defense, and the split in California precedent hindered
achievement of this goal. Lawlor resolved the uncertain standard
presented by the conflicting precedents in Valinda and River Bank by
holding the party responsible for the structure of the deal liable for
their actions.56
A. The Lawlor Decision Cripples Valinda
Initially the Lawlor holding appears unfair to guarantors because
facially it substantially decreases the availability of the sham
guarantee defense for borrowers.57 However, the purpose behind
section 580d is to prevent lenders from having two means of
recovery from the borrower as part of a nonjudicial foreclosure,58 the
first being the security interest and the second being a deficiency
judgment.59 Similarly, a borrower should not be able to sign up for a
loan using a limited liability entity, blur the line between themselves
and the entity creating a sham, and cleverly limit the lender’s
recovery to the security interest. Both parties must abide by the
antideficiency rules.
Unfortunately, the court’s decision in Valinda did not create an
equal playing field for lenders and borrowers. Although the Lawlor
decision did not explicitly overturn Valinda, it rendered the Valinda
holding impotent. The two rulings cannot coexist because Lawlor
forces borrowers to personally accept the consequences of their
business entity, whereas Valinda allows them to avoid personal
liability.60 Under the holding in Lawlor, individuals cannot escape
liability by guaranteeing a loan for their business entity and later
55. Id.
56. See Cal. Bank & Trust v. Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 48 (Ct. App. 2013), as modified
(Dec. 20, 2013).
57. See id.
58. Rans & Williams, supra note 3, at, 485.
59. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 580b, 580d (West 2012), amended by 2014 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 71 (S.B. 1304) (West); id. § 580c.
60. See id.
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claiming it was merely an instrument of the transaction.61 The
Lawlor court unequivocally stated, “[i]ndividuals may structure their
business dealings to limit their own personal liability, but they must
accept the risks that accompany the benefits of incorporation.”62 This
approach guts Valinda by setting forth the proposition that
guarantors are effectively estopped from representing their business
entity as a sham.
While this holding seems to paralyze the use of the sham
guarantee defense, in reality it has brought its use back within
reason. Effectively, the court’s decision correctly prevents
individuals from avoiding personal liability on their guarantee by
creating a sham guarantee.63 A crafty borrower should not be able to
simply form a limited liability entity to become the primary obligor
on the loan in order to create a sham guarantee. The Lawlor court
eliminated the potential for such manipulated shams by holding that
individuals were estopped from denying the existence of their
corporation.64
The Lawlor holding will limit future guarantors’ use of the sham
guarantee defense. The River Bank test for the sham guarantee
defense is a very high standard that a guarantor will be unlikely to
meet. This new standard is also important because it limits the use of
the defense to situations involving an actual sham.
B. The Future Effects of Lawlor’s Holding on Lenders
The Lawlor holding provides much needed guidance for lenders
to properly structure deals to avoid a sham guarantee defense.
Lenders, under the River Bank and Lawlor holdings, must be wary of
too much involvement in the structure of the financial transaction.
The combination of the River Bank decision with the new precedent
in Lawlor will give lenders clearer guidance on what qualifies as a
sham guarantee. The court will become suspicious of the structure of
the deal if the lender requires the borrower to set up a borrowing
business entity with the individual acting as the guarantor.65

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 49.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Rans & Williams, supra note 3, at 488.
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The Lawlor court’s decision protected creditors’ rights and
eroded some of the expansive foundation for sham guarantee
defenses that the Valinda court created. After River Bank and
Valinda, the law became unfavorable toward lenders because it was
unclear how the court would view their involvement in a financial
transaction. Lawlor necessarily clarifies the standard by which
lenders should conduct their business.66 The court of appeals made
clear that had the original lender been involved in the structure of the
deal, as was the case in River Bank, the outcome of its holding would
have been different.67 The court provided that, “Defendants offered
no evidence . . . that Alliance attempted to separate Defendant’s
interest in the loans by making Cartwright Properties and Heritage
Orcas the borrowers while relegating Defendants to the position of
guarantors.”68 The court’s decision in this case importantly affirmed
both the holding and the standard for approaching sham guarantees
presented in River Bank.69
Significantly, the court in Lawlor strictly interpreted the holding
in River Bank.70 In order to satisfy the standard set forth in River
Bank, and reaffirmed by Lawlor, a party pleading the sham guarantee
defense must show that the lender “requested, required, or otherwise
had any involvement in selecting the entities, or the form of the
entities, that were the borrowers and primary obligors.”71 In Lawlor,
the court rejected wholesale the defendants’ argument that their
guarantee was a sham because the defendants created the
corporation, and consequently, the necessary legal separation for a
valid guarantee.72 The Lawlor court’s holding demands that the
lender have a role in either forming or requiring the formation of the
entity that is allegedly a sham obligor.73 Pursuant to the River Bank
and Lawlor holdings, a lender would have to dominate the structure
of the deal for a sham guarantee defense to become a possibility.74

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48.
See id.
See id. at 49.
Id.
See id.
Id.; River Bank Am. v. Diller, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 803 (Ct. App. 1995).
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In both River Bank and Lawlor, the court stated that the purpose
of the transaction, specifically whether it was structured to
circumvent section 580d, was the primary basis for reasoning a
lender-driven transaction would constitute a sham.75 If lenders were
permitted to circumvent the antideficiency legislation, guarantors in
California would have no protection in lending transactions because
lenders would have all the power in pursuing deficiency judgments.
The Lawlor and River Bank courts correctly drew a line, preventing
an over expansive grant of power to lenders. Indeed, the River Bank
court found some evidence that the purpose of the lender-driven
transaction was to permit recovery of deficiencies expressly
forbidden by section 580d.76
Finally, the Lawlor decision is so essential that the California
Legislature should amend the Civil Code to codify the holding. A
legislative amendment to California Civil Code section 2856 would
create binding authority for all California courts to follow.77 Adding
a subsection pertaining to the sham guarantee defense would
essentially treat the sham guarantor’s actions as a waiver of
protection under the antideficiency statutes. Without California
Supreme Court authority, it is possible conflicting authority could
continue to muddy the water surrounding the sham guarantee
defense. A legislative amendment would protect Lawlor’s holding
and provide a uniform application of the sham guarantee defense.
V. CONCLUSION
Although California’s law on sham guarantees remains
imperfect, the court’s decision in Lawlor has taken an important
position on the application of California’s sham guarantee defense.
By strictly interpreting the holding in River Bank, the court has
provided much needed guidance to lenders in a troubled financial
market. A lender controlling the structure of a financial transaction
should not be permitted to circumvent the antideficiency statutes, and
Lawlor and River Bank correctly prevented them from doing so.
75. Cal. Bank & Trust v. Lawlor, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 38, 48 (Ct. App. 2013), as modified
(Dec. 20, 2013); River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
76. River Bank Am., 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
77. California Civil Code section 2856 contains the statutory provisions pertaining to
guarantors and their ability to waive protection under the antideficiency statutes. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2856 (West 2012). Because Lawlor is only an appellate court decision, there is still no binding
authority statewide. An amendment to the statute would solve this problem.
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However, Lawlor also recognized that lenders need protection as
well, and the court’s holding necessarily balances these competing
interests.
The sham guarantee defense remains a key part of California’s
protection for borrowers and their guarantors. The Lawlor holding
protects guarantors when their financial transaction truly involves a
sham guarantee. But, the court’s holding, which limits the use of the
defense, is necessary to prevent abuse by guarantors attempting to
escape personal responsibility on their loan obligations.
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